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INTRODUCTION

Tort law has struggled to accommodate indeterminate victims
of toxic exposure. In the paradigm case, a defendant exposes a
population to a toxin, increasing the incidence of a particular disease.' For example, suppose that the exposure has increased a
population's rate of liver cancer from 10 in 100,000 to 15 in
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' The "paradigm case, is borrowed from Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71
MINN. L. REv. 1219, 1238 (1987), which contains an excellent discussion of causation
issues in toxic tort cases. See also Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 413 (D.
Utah 1984), rev'd 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987) ('Consider, for example, the problem
of the 'indeterminate plaintiff': We may know . . . that a group of people has a specific type of cancer and that some of them contracted that cancer from exposure to [a
particular toxin], but we do not know which individuals of that group were affected by
[that toxin]."); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 833-37 (E.D.N.Y.
1984).
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100,000. Under traditional tort standards, none of the cancer victims could recover because two-thirds of them would have contracted the disease anyway.2 Courts and commentators have vigorously
debated whether to impose liability in this type of case? After all,
the defendant likely did cause one-third of the cancer cases.4
Recently, this debate has intensified as increasing numbers of
plaintiffs have sought access to the tort system. In particular, the tort
system now faces not only actual disease victims but also exposed
persons who have not yet developed symptoms of disease. These
post-exposure, pre-symptom ("PEPS") plaintiffs have sought to maintain tort actions under a variety of theories, including increased risk
of disease', fear of disease6, and lost quality of life.7 Perhaps their
most successful path, however, has been to seek recovery for the
costs of medical monitoring.8
Traditional tort law standards would require a plaintiff to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the exposure more likely than not caused her cancer. See
Farber, supra note 1, at 1238; infra notes 53-54, 82-84 and accompanying text. No
plaintiff in the paradigm case, however, can satisfy this standard because it is more
likely than not that any individual cancer case is unrelated to the exposure.
I See, e.g., In re Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 740; Allen, 588 F. Supp. at 247;
Farber, supra note 1; David Rosenberg, Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A
'Public Law' Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 849 (1984).
4 Farber, supra note 1, at 1238.
1 See, e.g., Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985);
Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14 (D. Colo. 1984); cf. Sterling v. Velsicol
Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 322 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), rev'd, 855 F.2d 1188, 1205
(6th Cir. 1988) (refusing to uphold enhanced risk claim where level of increase in risk
2

was below 30/o).

6 See, e.g., Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1188; Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
781
F.2d 394, 413 (5th Cir. 1986); Potter v. Firestone Rubber and Tire Co., 863 P.2d 795,
818 (Cal. 1993).
1 See, e.g., Thompson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 621 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.
1980); Kumcz v. Honda N. Am., Inc., 166 F.R.D. 386 (W.D. Mich. 1996); Swiler v.
Baker's Super Mkt., Inc., 277 N.W.2d 697 (Neb. 1979); Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6
(Wyo. 1980).
1 Plaintiffs who seek compensation for medical monitoring generally do not purport
to seek recovery for anxiety, nor for any physical consequence of the exposure. Rather,
'[m]edical monitoring is ... intended to provide healthy plaintiffs with diagnostic examinations for the latency period of exposure-related diseases in the hope that early detection and treatment of the disease will be beneficial to the victim.' Carey C. Jordan,
Comment, Medical Monitoring in Toxic Tort Cases: Another Windfall for Texas Plaintiffs?,
33 Hous. L. REv. 473, 483 (1996). See Potter, 863 P.2d at 821 (in the context of a
toxic exposure action, a claim for medical monitoring seeks to recover the cost of future
periodic medical examinations intended to facilitate early detection and treatment of
disease caused by a plaintiff's exposure to toxic substances.'); Bill Charles Wells, The
Grin Without the Cat: Claims for Damages from Toxic Exposure Without Present Injury,
18 WM.& MARY J.ENVTL. L.285, 293 (1994) ("An action for medical monitoring seeks
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Medical monitoring first gained widespread attention when the
New Jersey Supreme Court decided Ayers v. Township of Jackson in
1987. 9 The Ayers court concluded that a group of plaintiffs who
had been exposed to toxic substances in their drinking water could
recover medical surveillance costs from their municipality, although
none of the plaintiffs had manifested symptoms of disease." During the next several years, a number of courts followed Ayers'
lead." In 1997, however, the United States Supreme Court took a
markedly different approach in Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co.
v. Buckley. 2
In Metro-North, the Court considered whether a PE/PS plaintiff
could recover medical monitoring costs in a Federal Employers'
Liability Act ("FELA") case. 3 Despite Ayers and its progeny, the
Court concluded that there was not "sufficient support in the common law" to support the claim. 4
[We are.., troubled ... by the potential systemic effects of creating a
The reality is that comnew, full-blown, tort law cause of action ....
sometimes can be reinterests
those
and
stake
at
are
peting interests
conciled in ways other than simply through the creation of a full-blown,
5
traditional tort law cause of action."

The Supreme Court's Metro-North decision places the "tort" of
medical monitoring at a crossroad, marking an important juncture at
which to examine the competing interests to which the Court refers. 6 This Article begins this examination by briefly sketching the
to recover only the cost of periodic medical examinations needed to detect the onset of
physical injury from chemical exposure.').
9 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
0 See infra notes 33-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the New Jersey
Supreme Court's opinion in Ayers.
" See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig. (Paoli II), 35 F.3d 717, 787 (3rd Cir.
1994); Potter, 863 P.2d at 795; Bums v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1987); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 979-81 (Utah 1993);
see also infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
22 521 U.S. 424, 117 S. Ct. 2113 (1997).
The plaintiff, a pipefitter, sued his employ, 117 S. Ct. at 2116.
1' 521 U.S. at
er, a railroad company, for exposing him to asbestos.
14 Id. at .,
2124.
Is Id.

16 This 'crossroad' has become even more significant in light of recently filed class
actions against the manufacturers of "fen-phen,' a diet pill produced from the drugs
Redux and fenfluramine. See Richard B. Schmitt, Thinning the Ranks: Diet-Pill Litigation
Finds Courts Frowning on Mass Settlements, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 1998, at Al. These
lawsuits attempt to link fen-phen to heart valve problems in the pills' users. The suits,
however, do not seek damages related to the heart valve problems. Instead, they seek
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doctrinal development of medical monitoring. In so doing, the
Article challenges the assumption that it is appropriate to construe
the leading cases as creating a unique cause of action. Instead, the
Article argues that medical monitoring simply describes a potential
remedy in established tort actions. From that baseline, the Article
asserts that courts ordinarily should award medical monitoring damages to a PEPS plaintiff only when toxic exposure has more than
doubled that plaintiff's risk of disease-that is, when the plaintiff can
prove that if she later contracts the disease, the defendant's conduct
was more likely than not the cause. 7 In most other cases, the Article concludes, the tort system is simply the wrong place for
plaintiffs to seek recovery.'"
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICAL MONITORING

A.

Future Medical Expenses

Although awards for medical monitoring in toxic exposure
cases are unusual, it is commonplace for courts to award future
medical expenses in traditional tort settings. 9 Typically, courts
award such damages where a plaintiff has suffered some physical
impact and is seeking medical care to treat the resulting harm.2"
The impact case that most directly influenced later courts considering medical monitoring claims is the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals' decision in Friends For All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed

damages for the costs of medical monitoring for future heart valve problems. Id.
17 See infra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 154-81 and accompanying text (discussing the circumstances under
which the government should fund medical monitoring programs for exposed individuals).
1. See generally 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 919 (1988); see also Metro-North,
521
U.S. at _
117 S. Ct. at 2121 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 924(c) (1977));
J. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 5.18 (2d ed. 1991); Jordan, supra note 8,
at 486 & n.73 (citing Coll v. Sherry, 148 A.2d 481, 486 (N.J. 1959)).
20 See Leslie S. Gara, Medical Surveillance Damages: Using
Common Sense and the
Common Law to Mitigate the Dangers Posed by Environmental Hazards, 12 HARV.
ENVTL L. REv. 265, 277 (1988). Gara cites to Hartley v. Mateika, 585 S.W.2d 240 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1979), as typical. In Hartley, "the defendant's automobile struck a police car,
and the defendant was at fault. Following the accident, the police officer went to a
hospital emergency room for a medical examination and x-rays to determine if he was
injured in any way as a result of the accident. The tests failed to reveal an injury, but
the jury awarded damages for the costs of the precautionary exam, believing testimony
that it was reasonably sought as a result of the defendant's act.' Gara, supra, at 277.
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Aircraft Corp. 2 Friends For All Children involved a claim on behalf of 150 Vietnamese orphans who survived a military transport
plane crash. The plaintiffs sought an injunction ordering the plane's
manufacturer to finance a medical surveillance program to determine whether depressurization of the plane's cabin caused the
children to suffer brain damage.22 The district court concluded that
the manufacturer should compensate the children for the costs, and
the appellate court agreed. The court reasoned that such compensation was no different from a damage award in a simple, everyday
tort action. As an example, the appellate court provided a hypothetical case involving "Smith," who knocked down "Jones" while driving a motorbike through a red light.23 In the hypothetical, Jones
entered a hospital where doctors recommended that he undergo
tests to determine whether he suffered internal head injuries. The
tests came back negative, but Jones sued Smith for costs associated
with the diagnostic exams.24 The court concluded:
From our example, it is clear that even in the absence of physical injury
Jones ought to be able to recover the cost for the various diagnostic examinations proximately caused by Smith's negligent action. . . . The cause
of action ... accords with commonly shared intuitions of normative justice which underlie the common law of tort. The motorbike rider, through
his negligence, caused the plaintiff, in the opinion of medical experts, to
need specific medical services. . . . Similarly, in this case, the crash exposed the plaintiffs to the risk of serious brain damage,... [and] comprehensive diagnostic examinations are needed to determine whether and
to what extent treatment may be necessary."

746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'g Friends For All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed
Aircraft Corp., 587 F. Supp. 180 (D.D.C. 1984).
2 Friends For All Children, 587 F. Supp. at 188.
Friends For All Children, 746 F.2d at 825.
21

24

Id.

Id. The Friends For All Children courts, however, did not envision direct payment
to the plaintiffs to compensate them for the cost of medical surveillance. Rather, the
district court ordered the defendant to pay money into a court registry to which the
plaintiffs would submit vouchers (reviewable by the defendant) describing the medical
care received and the cost for that care. See Friends For All Children, 587 F. Supp. at
202. Later medical monitoring decisions echoed this hesitation to award plaintiffs lump -sum damages. See Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 825 (Cal.
1993); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 314 (N.J. 1987); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 920, 982 (Utah 1993). Indeed, this hesitation was
among the United States Supreme Court's primary reasons for disallowing the medical
monitoring claim in Metro-North. See Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521
U.S. 424, __, 117 S. Ct. 2113, 2122-23 (1997).
25
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Subsequent courts seem to suggest that, through this language,
the court in Friends For All Children broke new ground by permitting the plaintiffs to recover medical surveillance costs. 2 6 However,

this is hardly the case. To the extent that Friends For All Children
articulated even a slight extension of existing tort doctrine, the
opinion must be viewed within its unusual (if not unique) fact setting." The facts of Friends For All Children, for example, should
limit its application to an impact-if not a physical injury-situation.28 Moreover, the case involved a discrete number of plaintiffs
(at least compared to a mass exposure case), and the remedy was
limited to diagnostic testing (it did not extend to lifetime medical
monitoring).29 Further, the Friends for All Children court explicitly
refused to award money damages, instead ordering equitable relief
and a court registry to pay for surveillance costs.3"
Indeed, prior to 1987, little (if any) precedent existed to support medical monitoring damages absent an impact that threatened
imminent harm.' In 1987, however, the New Jersey Supreme
26 See, e.g., Potter, 863 P.2d at 823; Ayers, 525 A.2d at 308; Hansen, 858 P.2d at

977.

27 See George W.C. McCarter, Medical Sue-Veillance: A History and Critique of the
Medical Monitoring Remedy in Toxic Tort Litigation, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 227, 234-35
(1993) (describing Friends For All Children as "anomalous").
28 See Metro-North, 521 U.S. at ___, 117 S. ct. at 2122 (distinguishing asbestos
exposure case from Friends For All Children, which the Court described as a 'traumatic
physical impact" case).
2 See McCarter, supra note 27, at 235 n.34 ("Contrasting the limited remedy in
Friends with the possible right to lifetime monitoring under Ayers suggests that 'diagnostic testing' is not synonymous with 'medical monitoring' as now understood.").
3 McCarter, supra note 27, at 235 n.34; see also infra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
1, Cf. Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of Am., 480 A.2d 647 (Del. 1984) (rejecting
the claims of spouses of asbestos workers due to a lack of proof of exposure to asbestos fibers); Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 394 N.E.2d 1369, 1376 (11. App. Ct. 1979)
("possible future damages in a personal injury action are not compensable unless reasonably certain to occur"). But see Hagerty v. L & L Marine Senws., 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir.
1986) (upholding medical monitoring award where plaintiff was doused with a considerable dose of toxic chemicals). Some commentators have asserted that Askey v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 102 A.D.2d 130, 477 N.Y.S.2d 242 (4th Dep't 1984), a case involving individuals exposed to toxic waste from a landfill, is the first case to permit medical
monitoring costs in the absence of a physical injury. See John J. Kalas, Medical Surveillance Damages in Toxic Tort Litigation: A Half Hearted Embrace, 2 U. BAIT. J. ENVTL
L. 126, 132-33 (1992) (describing Askey as the "first case to herald medical surveillance
damages in the hazardous waste context in the absence of the traditional physical injury
tort requirement"). However, as Mr. McCarter points out, the decision in Askey cannot
be read outside the context of Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y.
287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936), which held that the statute of limitations in an exposure case
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Court decided Ayers and altered the legal landscape in the area of
32
medical monitoring.
B. Ayers v. Township of Jackson
In Ayers, residents of Jackson Township, New Jersey, brought
an action against their municipality for permitting toxic pollutants
from a landfill to leach into an aquifer that provided residential
drinking water. The plaintiffs, none of whom sought recovery for
illnesses related to toxic exposure,33 sought damages pursuant to
the New Jersey Tort Claims Act for impairment of quality of life,
emotional distress, enhanced risk of disease, and medical monitor3
these theories,
ing.34 A jury awarded damages based on three of

but the intermediate appellate court upheld only the judgment
based on the impairment of quality of life.36 The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the appellate division, except with regard

runs from the date of the last exposure, even where the injured person is unaware of
the wrong or his injury. Schmidt, 200 N.E. at 827; see Askey, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 246-47;
McCarter, supra note 27, at 232-33. The Askey court described the proof problems
under such a rule as "formidable." Askey, 477 N.Y.S.2d at* 247. The court continued:
In light of the foregoing, it would appear that under the proof offered here
persons exposed to toxic chemicals emanating from the landfill have an increased risk of invisible genetic damage and a present cause of action for their
injury, and may recover all "reasonably anticipated" consequential damages.
The future expense of medical monitoring, could be a recoverable consequential damage provided that plaintiffs can establish with a reasonable degree of
medical certainty that such expenditures are "reasonably anticipated" to be incurred by reason of their exposure.
Id. The fact that medical monitoring damages might be recoverable in light of Schmidt,
however, does not (and did not) translate into the permission of medical monitoring
awards where the "discovery rule" tolls the statue of limitations. Cf. Gerardi v. Nuclear
Util. Serv., Inc., 149 Misc. 2d 657, 566 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1991).
32 Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987). The first reported reference to the plaintiffs' medical monitoring claims is found in the New Jersey Superior
Court's decision denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the claims. See Ayers v.
Township of Jackson, 461 A.2d 184, 190 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983).
525 A.2d at 297.
Id. at 292.
3 The trial court judge dismissed the "enhanced risk" claim. See id. at 291, 297.
Id. at 291 (citing appellate court decision).
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to the issue of medical monitoring. On that claim, the court reinstated the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. The court
concluded:
[Wie hold that the cost of medical surveillance is a compensable item of
damages where the proofs demonstrate, through reliable expert testimony
predicated upon the significance and extent of exposure to chemicals, the

toxicity of the chemicals, the seriousness of the diseases for which individuals are at risk, the relative increase in the chance of onset of disease

in those exposed, and the value of early diagnosis, that such surveillance
to monitor the effect of exposure to toxic chemicals is reasonable and
necessary. 7

The Ayers court can be criticized for making some leaps of
logic in reaching this conclusion 38-not the least of which con-

Id. at 312.
First, the court relied heavily on Friends For All Children without recognizing its
very different fact setting. (i.e., in Friends For All Children the plaintiffs suffered from
discrete physical trauma and sought diagnostic examinations; in Ayers the plaintiffs suffered from long-term exposure to toxins and sought open-ended medical surveillance).
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
Second, the Ayers court premised its decision on an assumption that the plaintiffs
had experienced a "significant' level of enhanced risk of disease. See Ayers, 525 A.2d
at 309 (the appellate court's "formulation unduly impedes the ability of courts to re31

38

cognize that medical science may necessarily and properly intervene where there is a

significant but unquantified risk of serious disease") (emphasis added); id. at 303 ( '[t]he
jury could reasonably have inferred from [the plaintiffs' expert's] testimony that the risk,
although unquantified, was medically significant.") (emphasis added). The intermediate
appellate court in Ayers, however, had concluded that the record did not "rule out the
probability that such increase [was] so microscopically small as to be meaningless.'
Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 493 A.2d 1314, 1323 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 525 A.2d 287 (1987). The supreme court's apparent reliance
on a significant level of enhanced risk, therefore, may have been unsupported.
Third, despite recognizing the plaintiffs' claims, the court expressed dissatisfaction
with the normal method of compensating plaintiffs through a lump-sum payment. Instead,
the court suggested that medical surveillance payments in mass exposure cases be administered through court-supervised funds. "A lump-sum verdict," the court conceded,
"attempts to estimate future expenses, but cannot predict the amounts that actually will
be expended for medical purposes." Ayers, 525 A.2d at 314 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the court refused to disturb the jury's lump-sum award. See id. at 315 ('Such a
result would be unfair to these plaintiffs, since the medical-surveillance issue was tried
conventionally, and neither party requested the trial court to withhold from the jury the
power to return a lump-sum verdict for each plaintiff in order that relief by way of a
fund could be provided."); see also Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521
U.S. 424, __

117 S. Ct. 2113, 2122-23 (1997).

In short, the Ayers court expanded the Friends For All Children rule into an entirely different factual realm. It did so upon a dubious assumption that the plaintiffs experienced a significant level of enhanced risk, and it did so despite conceding that the
normal method for awarding tort law damages was less than satisfactory in this case.

19981
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cerns the court's questionable assumption that the plaintiffs suffered
9
from a "significant" enhanced risk of disease. Nevertheless, several courts soon followed Ayers' lead and permitted PUPS plaintiffs to
recover medical monitoring damages without proof of a quantified
level of enhanced risk of disease.
C. After Ayers
In the late 1980's and early 1990's, several courts permitted
4
PUPS plaintiffs to maintain actions for medical monitoring costs, "
4
and a number of commentators applauded the development. '
However, little consensus formed on exactly what these court decisions had created. Some commentators viewed the decisions as
42
creating a new and unique cause of action. Others asserted that
43
the decisions simply described a medical monitoring remedy.
Still others argued that medical monitoring referred to both."
This lack of consensus has made it difficult to discuss medical
monitoring on common ground.4" To lay the groundwork for a
19 See supra note 38.
40 See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig. (Paoli II), 35 F.3d 717, 787 (3rd Cir.
1994); Bums v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 33-34 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Potter
v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 821-25 (Cal. 1993); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 979-81 (Utah 1993); see also Redland Soccer Club,
Inc. v. Oep't of Army and Dep't of Defense of the United States, 696 A.2d 137 (Pa.
1997). The New Jersey Supreme Court, itself, articulated some limits to the Ayers rule in
1993 when it decided Theer v. Philip Carey, 628 A.2d 724 (N.J. 1993). In Theer, the
court refused to permit the award of medical monitoring damages to the wife of an
asbestos worker who was only indirectly exposed to toxins from washing her husband's
clothes. See id.
"' See, e.g., Gara, supra note 20; see also Blumenberg, infra note 49; Slagel, infra
note 56.
42 See Gara, supra note 20, at 267 ("This cause of action is both desirable from a
public policy perspective and consistent with tort and damages theory.") (emphasis added);. Susan L. Martin & Jonathan D. Martin, Tort Actions for Medical Monitoring: Warranted or Wasteful, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 121, 122 (1995) ("This article concludes that
creating a cause of action for medical monitoring when there is no demonstrable injury
is unwarranted.") (emphasis added).
" See Potter, 863 P.2d at 823 ("Recognition that a defendant's conduct has created
the need for future medical monitoring does not create a new tort. It is simply a compensable item of damage when liability is established under traditional tort theories of
recovery.'); Steven H. Huff et al., Medical Monitoring: Who Pays for Medical Surveillance when People are Exposed to Toxic Substances?, 73 MICH. B.J. 1044, 1045 (1994)
("One must first still prove the elements of a traditional tort before medical monitoring
costs are recoverable." (footnote omitted)).
" See Wells, supra note 8, at 294 ("[m]edical monitoring claims may be either an
element of legal damages, an independent tort, or equitable relief.').
41 Vague standards for a new medical monitoring tort create trouble for litigants and

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64: 1

useful discussion, this section of the Article disputes the notion that
Ayers and its progeny have created a unique medical monitoring
cause of action. Instead, the Article suggests that the phrase "medical monitoring" should only be used to describe a remedy that
courts might award, under clearly defined circumstances, 6 to
plaintiffs who prove the elements of an established tort law cause of
action.
1.

Organizing Principles

Modern tort actions are generally organized around the concepts of fault, causation, and damages. 47 The leading medical monitoring decisions, however, do not adhere to this structure. For example, when listing the necessary factors for recovery, some courts
vaguely suggest that defendants will be liable for medical monitoring costs whenever they expose a person to a toxin.48 In contrast,
others courts refer to "negligent exposure," suggesting that a plaintiff
must prove fault.49 No court, however, addresses whether (or why)
judges alike. Potential plaintiffs, for example, have few signals about when it might be
sensible to invest in medical monitoring litigation. Potential defendants have little information upon which to base risk assessment decisions. Moreover, judges who face future
medical monitoring claims are undoubtedly frustrated trying to make sense of the patchwork of decisions that fail to explain why medical monitoring claims are permitted or
not. See infra notes 117-53 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of a medical
monitoring standard clearly aligned with a level of enhanced risk).
" These "circumstances" relate primarily to a clearly defined level of enhanced risk
of disease. See infra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
47 Professor Nicolas P. Terry, for example, explains that courts normally distribute tort
law fact patterns among broad "allocation models' based on the defendant's level of
fault. See Nicolas P. Terry, Collapsing Torts, 25 CONN. L. REv. 717, 718-19 (1993).
Professor Terry asserts that "the search for an allocational ground zero has distilled to a
concentration of scholarship on whether tort liability, historically, was fault-based or strict
liability-based." Id. at 720.
41 See, e.g., Day v. NLO, 851 F. Supp. 869, 881 (S.D. Ohio 1994). The Reporters
for the American Law Institute's Enterprise Liability Report equivocate a bit in this regard, stating that the imposition of medical surveillance costs "will facilitate tort litigation
that directs a meaningful and timely sanction against hazardous activities." 2 AMERICAN
LAw INSTITUTE ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBIUTY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 379 (1991) [hereinafter
Enterprise Responsibility Report] (emphasis added). The Reporters' use of the phrase
"hazardous activities" seems to imply that strict liability might be an appropriate allocation model in a medical monitoring case in light of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT'S

position that tort liability ought to be imposed on those who engage in "abnormally
dangerous activities." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-20 (1977).
49 See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig. (Paoli II), 35 F.3d 717, 787 (3d Cir.

1994) (plaintiff must show that he was exposed "through the negligent actions of the
defendant") (quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig. (Paoli 1), 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d

1998]
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it would treat a PE/PS medical monitoring claim any differently than
it would treat a post-exposure case involving physical harm with
regard to fault."0 Of course, distinctions between fault-based and
no-fault torts are not necessarily static. Distinctions are important,
though, because actors often make risk-management, insurance, and
litigation decisions based on such cues.'
To provide clear signals, courts (and commentators) should
refrain from casting medical monitoring as a unique cause of action.
Instead, courts should award medical monitoring damages only
within the context of well-established tort theories that actors2 understand and within a body of established tort law doctrine. By so
doing, courts will improve predictability and certainty compared to
the current environment in which few people agree on what medical monitoring means, and in which liability depends on a factfinder's assessment of vague factors that have little explicit
connection to the nature of a defendant's activity.
("exCir. 1990)); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 979 (Utah 1993)
howevposure was caused by the defendant's negligence . . . ."). It is hard to imagine,
to a
er, that medical monitoring proponents would consciously limit medical monitoring
and
negligence theory. This is especially true in light of the argument that deterrence
See
action.
of
cause
new
a
recognizing
for
reasons
primary
cost internalization are the
of Future
Amy B. Blumenberg, Note, Medical Monitoring Funds: The Periodic Payment
661, 682
Medical Surveillance Expenses in Toxic Exposure Litigation, 43 HASTINGS L.J.
costly
(1992) (mentioning 'the deterrence of future toxic torts as a result of potentially
the
("Requiring
279
at
20,
note
supra
Gara,
surveillance.");
liability for ongoing medical
his activity
tortious actor to internalize the costs of medical surveillance necessitated by
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' After all, it is normally the character of the defendant's conduct (not the nature of
the plaintiff's harm) that drives such a decision.
5' See Terry, supra note 47, at 720. Thus, according to Professor Terry, courts have
to "define the fact pattern they intend to allocate, provide information as
responsibility
a
to the precise risk-distribution sought, and provide operational rules for individual decision making." Id. at 721-22.
damages in certain circum52 Courts, for example, might award medical monitoring
nuisance, or even trespass.
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the
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Courts also might award medical monitoring damages in a strict liability action if the
defendant's conduct is "abnormally dangerous" as that term is commonly understood.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 519-520 (1977)).
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2. Causation and the Question of Injury
Regardless of whether a medical monitoring plaintiff proceeds
on a fault-based or a no-fault theory, the plaintiff also must prove
actual causation-an essential element in any tort cause of action. s3
As Professor Robert A. Baruch Bush has written, in tort law an "individual is responsible for all he does, but for only what he does." s4
Medical monitoring plaintiffs, however, have a significant problem-they are not truly seeking compensation for what the defendant has done, rather they are seeking compensation to protect
against what the defendant's conduct might do in the future. 5
Proponents of a medical monitoring tort have worked around
this problem by creatively defining the PEUPS plaintiff's "injury."
Recognizing that the mere possibility of future harm is not sufficient
to support recovery, 6 they attempt to characterize the injury as the
exposure itself or simply the reasonable need for additional medical
surveillance. 7 Under this view, a defendant's conduct caused the
" See W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 41 (5th ed. 1984);
see also ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRrr OF THE COMMON LAW 37 (1921); Paul J. zwier,

'Cause in Fact' in Tort Law - A Philosophical and Historical Examination, 31 DEPAUL
L. REV. 769, 784-85 (1982).
1 Robert A. Baruch Bush, Between Two Worlds: The Shift from Individual to Group
Responsibility in the Law of Causation of Injury, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1473, 1474 (1986).
'5 See Martin & Martin, supra note 42, at 122 ("Traditionally, plaintiffs in tort cases
bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that they have been
injured by the defendants. . . . In medical monitoring cases, these basic principles must
be avoided for plaintiffs to be successful."); Wells, supra note 8, at 287 ('non-injury"
claims, such as medical monitoring, "attempt to avoid the necessity of proving causation
by doing away with the need to prove injury."). The troubling issue of causation in
mass exposure cases has spawned a wealth of interesting legal scholarship, only a fraction of which can be addressed here. For examples of work in the area, see Farber,
supra note 1; Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic
Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw.
U.
L. REv. 643 (1992); Glen 0. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation
for
Tortuous Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779 (1985); Rosenberg, supra note 3; Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 773
(1997).
' See Allan T. Slagel, Note, Medical Surveillance Damages: A Solution to the Inadequate Compensation of Toxic Tort Victims, 63 IND. LJ. 849, 859 (1988).
" See Blumenberg, supra note 49, at 675 (dilemma could be resolved by recognizing that individuals suffer from "a present, compensable injury, i.e., exposure to a level
necessitating medical surveillance."); Gara, supra note 20, at 275 (if "the injury claimed
is the medically determined 'need' for surveillance, the question for causation is relatively straightforward."); Jesse R. Lee, Medical Monitoring Damages: Issues Concerning
the Administration of Medical Monitoring Program, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 251, 263 (1994)
(problem could be avoided if "plaintiffs will characterize their exposure as injury in fact,
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exposure (or the need for additional surveillance) even if the defendant did not cause physical harm or even a quantifiable enhanced
risk of disease. Proponents support this characterization as consistent with the Restatement of Torts' definition of an injury as any
"legally protected interest." 8
If extended to PE/PS cases, however, this type of argument
could lead to an unprecedented expansion of the tort system. Susan
L. Martin and Jonathan D. Martin, for example, point to the large
number of hazardous waste sites in this country-and, more broadly, to the large number of chemicals to which most people are exposed-as reason to be concerned about a permissive reading of the
injury requirement in toxic exposure cases.
[1]n the very near future we may all have reasonable grounds to allege
that some negligent business exposed us to hazardous substances and to
get medical experts to testify that... there is a reasonable medical necessity for us to receive regular medical testing. The imminence of this scewillingness to give
nario suggests that courts may be shortsighted in their
59
up the injury element in medical monitoring cases.

Statistics support the breadth of Martin and Martin's argument.
According to the United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), billions of pounds of hazardous chemicals are emitted into
the air each year,60 and nearly twenty percent of the U.S. population (approximately 40 million people) live within four miles of a
hazardous waste site that the EPA has placed on its National Priority
List. 6' As the Supreme Court stated in Metro-North:
[liens of millions of individuals may have suffered exposure to substances
that might justify some form of substance-exposure-related medical moni-

rather than mere risk of future injury.").
Citing to the RESTATEMENT, for example, one commentator asserts:
ihe entire history of the development of tort law shows a continuous tendency to recognize as worthy of legal protection interests which were previously not protected at all. ... [l]n the torts context, "the meaning of the
word 'injury' . . differs from the sense in which the word 'injury' is often
used, to indicate the invasion of the interest in question has been caused by
conduct of such a character as to make it tortious."
Gara, supra note 20, at 272-73; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 924 (1979).
59 Martin & Martin, supra note 42, at 130-31.
o See Paul J. Komyatte, Medical Monitoring Damages: An Evolution of Environmental Tort Law, 23 COLO. LAw. 1533, 1533 (1994) (citing United States General Accounting Office, Air Pollution: EPA's Strategy and Resources May Be Inadequate to Control
Air Toxics (Washington, D.C.: GAO/RCED-91-143, June 26, 1991) at 9)).
61 Id. Komyatte reports that "eight out of ten Americans live near some type of
hazardous waste site." Id. (footnote omitted).
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toring .... And that fact, along with uncertainty as to the amount of
liability, could threaten both a "flood" of less important cases.., and the
systemic harms that can accompany "unlimited and unpredictable liability . . . .*

62

Most medical monitoring proponents at least implicitly recognize this overbreadth concern and suggest setting some hurdle to
limit the exposure-as-injury theory. 3 The proposed hurdle in most
cases is the level of enhanced risk of disease. 64 This reliance on
enhanced risk is ironic since these same proponents almost always
declare that enhanced risk itself is not compensable. 5 Medical
monitoring advocates insist that this distinction is logical. The Ayers
62

Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424,

_

117 S. Ct. 2113,

2123 (1997).

" Several courts insist on proof of physical harm. See, e.g., Ball v. Joy Tech., Inc.,
958 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1991); Purjet v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., No. Civ. 1985/284, 1986 WL 1200, at *4 (D. V.I. Jan. 8, 1986).
' See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig. (Paoli II), 35 F.3d 717, 787 (3rd Cir.
1994) (plaintiff must suffer from "a significantly increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease.") (citing In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig. (Paoli I), 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d
Cir. 1990)); Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 824-25 (Cal. 1993)
("the relative increase in the chance of onset of disease in the exposed plaintiff...
compared to (a) the plaintiff's chances of developing the disease had he or she not
been exposed, and (b) the chances of the members of the public at large of developing
the disease . . . ."); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (NJ. 1987) (a
"relative increase in the chance of onset of disease in those exposed . . . .'); Hansen v.

Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 979 (Utah 1993) (increased risk which must
be "significant"). The Reporters for the ALl Enterprise Responsibility Report (apparently
facing some resistance to the entire concept of medical monitoring) suggested that a
"substantial" level of enhanced risk should exist before the need for medical monitoring
would be considered an injury in an particular case. See Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1, 69 & n.261 ("Medical monitoring was this Article's
most controversial recommendation when I presented a draft to ALI's General Meeting in
May, 1991"). The Reporters explain:
To use a hypothetical example, it would be inappropriate for a court to order
a defendant to fund annual colonoscopies for all 100,000 people residing in
the area of a toxic exposure where the exposure is projected to increase the
incidence of colon cancer from 3 to 5. A much more substantial disease risk
should be indicated before damages are awarded to cover individually tailored
modes of medical surveillance ....
Enterprise Responsibility Report, supra note 48, at 379-80 n.60.
Most commentators-even those who advocate a liberal injury requirement-end up
agreeing, at least in a backhanded fashion. See Gara, supra note 20, at 276 ('the relevant question becomes whether medical testimony that there exists an enhanced danger
of a future injury can be considered 'mere speculation.'") (emphasis added).
6 See Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 785; Ayers, 525 A.2d at 307-08; Hansen, 858 P.2d 976
& n.6; see also Potter, 863 P.2d at 825 (permitting recovery for medical monitoring will
not allow damages to be awarded "solely upon a showing of an increased but
unquantified risk resulting from exposure to toxic chemicals.").
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court, for example, asserted that a medical monitoring claim stands
on "different footing" than an enhanced risk claim because the,
former attempts to compensate only the cost of medical care that
might facilitate early diagnosis and treatment of disease, while the
latter forces judges and juries to speculate about damages that might
never occur.66 The author of an oft-cited article on medical
monitoring concurs:
[Claims for enhanced risk] are clearly a matter of speculation; plaintiffs
making such claims request compensation for an injury that may never in
fact develop. By contrast, [claims for medical monitoring] involve a present injury: plaintiffs are seeking compensation for readily ascertainable
costs to be expended upon what can be verified as a reasonably necessary
67
medical procedure.

At first glance, this distinction is appealing. However, when
one recalls that significant enhanced risk is almost always a predicate to medical monitoring recovery, the distinction begins to look
like an enhanced risk "Trojan horse": enhanced risk itself is not
compensable, but if you demonstrate an increased risk of disease,
you can recover medical monitoring costs ...

as a means of com-

pensation for the enhanced risk. This Article asserts that the law
should be more straightforward: in certain cases, enhanced risk is
compensable, and the cost of medical surveillance may be part of
the appropriate remedy.68

Ayers, 525 A.2d at 307-08. To be fair, the Ayers majority limited its discussion to
a situation where the enhanced risk of disease was unquantified and where the plaintiffs
had not yet manifested any symptoms of disease. Id. at 306.
67 Gara, supra note 20, at 286.
1 Of course, medical monitoring logically must be predicated upon evidence that
the monitoring will make early detection and treatment of disease possible and beneficial. See, e.g., Paoli, 35 F.3d at 787. In addition, medical monitoring recovery does
not automatically preclude the possibility that 'enhanced risk," itself, has some compensable value. See, e.g., Note, Latent Harms and Risk-Based Damages, 111 HARV. L. REV.
1505 (1998); Keith W. Lapeze, Comment, Recovery for Increased Risk of Disease in
Louisiana, 58 LA. L. REV. 249 (1997); Deirdre A. McDonnell, Comment, Increased Risk
of Disease Damages: Proportional Recovery as an Alternative to the All or Nothing
System Exemplified by Asbestos Cases, 24 B.C. ENVrL AFF. L. REv. 623, 640 (1997); see
also Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc);
Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985). However, in any
PE/PS situation, a reference to the level of increased risk of disease is almost unavoidable. For example, in the medical monitoring context, even if one accepts the "reasonable-need-for-surveillance-as-injury' argument, proof of what constitutes "reasonable need"
will almost surely come from expert medical testimony. Inevitably, the expert's opinion
will relate to the plaintiff's level of enhanced risk.
66
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When approached in this fashion, things become almost
straightforward from a traditional tort law perspective. Regardless of
the underlying theory, a plaintiff needs to prove that the defendant's
act or omission caused his injury. The injury is not the "exposure"
or the "need for surveillance"; it is the fact that the exposure enhanced the plaintiff's risk of disease.69 The only difficult issue, and
the issue that few people address, is the level of enhanced risk that
should give rise to tort liability.70 The following section attempts to
resolve that problem.
II. AWARDING DAMAGES FOR MEDICAL MONITORING

A.

The Enhanced Risk Standard

It is clear that funding for medical surveillance of individuals
who have been exposed to toxic substances would, in many instances, have a positive societal impact. 71 The tort system, however, may not be the appropriate place to obtain such funding.72 In
particular, tort law should apply only when a PEPS plaintiff can
prove that, if she were to develop the disease, it would be more
likely than not that the exposure actually caused the disease. In
terms of enhanced risk, this would require a plaintiff to prove that
the exposure more than doubled her risk of disease.73
This proposed standard requires several initial refinements.
First, the proposed standard should apply only to plaintiffs who
have suffered no symptoms of disease, nor any significant physical
trauma. For those who have, courts should continue to treat medical
monitoring costs as a "future medical expenses" component of
69 See Brennan, supra note 64, at 67 ('Compensation for monitoring through a system of periodic examinations for plaintiffs, recognizes that increase risk is a form of
injury.') (emphasis added). Professor Brennan later adds: '[T-here must be some scintilla
of evidence of a toxic injury, or a significant potential for such injury, before medical
monitoring can be granted.' Id. at 69 (emphasis added).
7' See infra notes 154-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of how administrative compensation should fill the void when tort law would not apply.
" See infra notes 137-46, 167, 181 and accompanying text.
72 See infra notes 147-53 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 154-81 and
accompanying text.
73 See infra notes 85-95 and accompanying text. Using the 'paradigm case,' see
supra note 1 and accompanying text, as an example, a plaintiff ordinarily would need to
demonstrate that the exposure increased her chances of contracting cancer from 10 in
100,000 to more than 20 in 100,000 in order to recover medical monitoring costs from
the defendant in a tort action.
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damages. 4 This recognizes that medical monitoring in a PFPS
case is an extension of established tort principles, yet connects the
extension to the tradition of individualized causation.7 s Second,
when possible, the standard should relate to relevant individual
circumstances concerning the risk of disease."6 Third, the standard
should incorporate a minimum level of enhanced risk as the threshold to medical monitoring recovery.77 Admittedly, defining such a
threshold is difficult. One might, for example, suggest an absolute
cutoff-for example, no recovery unless there is a five or ten or
twenty percent absolute increase in risk. A less arbitrary threshold,
however, could be established by following a suggestion from Professor Troyen Brennan. Professor Brennan proposes that courts limit
medical monitoring recovery to those who have been exposed to
"significant concentrations of one of the.., most toxic chemicals as
designated by the [Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry ("ATSDR")]." 78 As opposed to a numerical enhanced risk cut-

off, Professor Brennan's suggestion has the benefit of clarity and
rationality in that those who compile the ATSDR list are primarily
concerned with the overall risk posed by each substance.79 Finally,

74 See Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, ___, 117 S. Ct.
2113, 2122 (1997) (citing Hagerty v. L & L Marine Services, Inc., 788 F.2d 315 (5th
Cir. 1986); supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
75 See infra notes 85-106 and accompanying text.
' For example, if a plaintiff in the paradigm case, see supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text, is a heavy smoker, and if an expert testifies that smokers have a background risk rate of 15 cancer cases per 100,000, then that plaintiff must prove that the
exposure has caused her to have more than a 30 in 100,000 risk of disease to recover
medical monitoring damages in a tort action.
" Such a threshold would ensure that a reasonable relationship exists between medical monitoring damages and damages eventually paid for a proportion of diseases that
actually ensue. As the Reporters for the Enterprise Responsibility Report explain, 'it
would be inappropriate for a court to order a defendant to fund [medical surveillance]
for all 100,000 people residing in the area of a toxic exposure where the exposure is
projected to increase the incidence of [a particular disease] from 3 to 5. Enterprise Responsibility Report, supra note 48, at 379-80 n.60 (citing SARA § 104(i)(9) as utilizing a
similar standard in an analogous context); see id. at 373-74 (compensation for slight increases in risk-'on the order of 2 or 3 percent . . . should fall mainly within the
purview of state and federal environmental regulation.'); Brennan, supra note 64, at 69.
'a See Brennan, supra note 64, at 69. Professor Brennan, who describes the issue as
"tractable,' asserts that setting a threshold "will be necessary to prevent the overdeterrence that would come with excessively broad use of medical monitoring damage
awards.'
7 See CERCLA § 104(i); see also infra note 122 and accompanying text. The approach, however, need not be absolutely rigid. Courts, for example, should be given the
flexibility to award damages in cases where plaintiffs are exposed to toxins that pose a
comparable risk to those on the ATSDR, even if the toxin is not on the list.
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this proposal would permit the award of medical monitoring damages in appropriate cases under any established "allocation model."8"
Damages, for example, would not be limited to negligence cases, as
some medical monitoring proponents suggest.8'
B. Justifying the Standard
1. Connection to Causation
The standard set forth above is designed to ensure that, when
tort law awards medical monitoring damages, it maintains a connection to traditional causation principles. As discussed above, tort law
ordinarily requires that a plaintiff connect her injury, by a preponderance of the evidence, to the defendant's act or omission.82 If
medical monitoring damages are awarded without regard to an
enhanced risk standard, the causation rule is completely destroyed-that is, in many cases, the law would force a defendant to
bear the responsibility of monitoring for the possible onset of a
disease that likely was unconnected to its conduct. Under this
Article's proposed standard, however, a connection to the tradition
of individual responsibility exists83-the defendant is asked only to
bear the cost of monitoring for the onset of disease that, under the
preponderance rule, would not have occurred but for the
defendant's act or omission.84
8 See supra note 47.
81 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. It is important to emphasize that this
proposal does not suggest that other individuals who have been exposed to toxins, but
who have not yet manifested any disease, should never receive financial assistance for
medical monitoring. This assistance, however, should not come from the tort system. See
infra notes 154-81 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 53-54.
Although not entirely conventional (nor uncontroversial), the level of expansion
from traditional causation principles envisioned by this proposal has precedent. For example, in the well-known case of Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948), the California Supreme Court permitted the plaintiff to proceed in a tort action against two hunters
who may have shot him, without forcing the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that either hunter caused his harm. See Andrew R. Klein, Beyond DES:
Rejecting the Application of Market Share Liability in Blood Products Litigation, 68 TUL
L. REv. 883, 891-94 (1994) (arguing that the rule in Summers retains substantial "links'
to the traditional rule of causation); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B
(1992). Similarly, a number of courts have permitted plaintiffs to proceed in tort actions
where plaintiffs have proven only that the defendant's conduct reduced their chance of
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a. Enhanced Risk and the PreponderanceStandard
The above assertion is not meant to oversimplify the difficultie~s
that plaintiffs face in proving actual causation in toxic exposure
cases.8" In general, plaintiffs must clear two hurdles. First, plaintiffs
must prove general causation (that the substance is capable of causing disease).86 Second, they must prove specific causation (that the
substance caused the particular plaintiff's disease). 87 Because scientific proof of specific causation is often difficult to obtain, many
courts permit plaintiffs to prove specific causation by showing that
the exposure increased their risk of contracting disease.
The finder of fact is asked to infer that because the risk is demonstrably

greater in the general population due to exposure to the substance, the
claimant's injury was more likely than not caused by that substance. Such
a theory concedes that science cannot tell us what caused a particular
plaintiff's injury. It is based on a policy determination that when the incidence of a disease or injury is sufficiently elevated due to exposure to a
and exhibits the
substance, someone who was exposed to that substance
88
disease or injury can raise a fact question on causation.

Substantial debate has ensued over the level of increased risk
sufficient to support a finding of causation under a preponderance
of the evidence rule. On one end of the spectrum are proponents of
a "strong" version of the preponderance rule. These individuals
would require epidemiological evidence 9 that exposure increased
survival. See Herskovitz v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474 (Wash.
1983); Robinson, supra note 55 at 792.
85 See Green, supra note 55; Ora Fred Harris, Toxic Tort Litigation and the Causation Element: Is There Any Hope of Reconciliation, 40 S.w. L.J. 909, 911-12 (1986).
86 See GERALD W. BOSTON & M. STUART MADDEN, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND
Toxic TORTS 342-45 (West 1994) (quoting Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d
1188 (6th Cir. 1988)); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex.
1997), cert. denied 118 S. Ct. 1799 (1998) (citing Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 14
(1993)); see also Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility:
The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REV. 845, 860 (1987) (referring to general
and specific causation as 'substance" and "source" causation).
87 See Abraham, supra note 86, at 860.
Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 715.
89 Epidemiology is the scientific discipline concerned with disease distribution and
determinants among human populations. For a clear and concise introduction to epidemiology, see Gerald W. Boston, A Mass Exposure Model of Toxic Causation: The Content
of Scientific Proof and the Regulatory Experience, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 181, 231-274
(1993). Professor Boston describes the two major types of epidemiological studies: case-

control studies and cohort studies. Case-control studies 'compare individuals with the

disease (cases) to persons who do not have the disease (controls) in an attempt to ret-
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the probability of causation by more than fifty percent and
particularistic proof that the substance injured a particular plaintiff.9" Indeed, some commentators argue that epidemiological evidence1 alone cannot establish actual causation in an individual
9
case.

Others, however, argue for a "weaker" version of the preponderance rule that would support verdicts solely upon statistical
evidence that causation was "more than 50 percent probable."92 A
number of courts have interpreted "more than 50 percent probable"
as the equivalent of evidence that the "relative risk" of disease is
greater than two. 93 If relative risk is greater than two, the risk of
disease in the exposed population would be more than double the
risk of disease in the unexposed population.94 This, of course, is
the standard proposed by this Article as a threshold for the recovery
of medical monitoring damages. 95
A doubling threshold, however, is not without its critics, 96
rospectively determine commonalities within the diseased group which may reveal a relationship to an exposure to a chemical agent." Id. at 233. Cohort studies, "begin with a
group of exposed persons, compare them to a group of individuals who were not exposed, and track them prospectively to determine the incidence over time within the
two groups of a specific disease being investigated." Id. at 234; see also Havner, 953
S.W.2d at 715; Green, supra note 55, at 646-53.
9'Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 715 (citing In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F.
Supp. 1223 (1984)); Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 857.
91 See Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 715.
92 Id. (citing Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 857-58 and quoting In re Agent Orange,
611 F. Supp. at 1262).
9'Relative risk compares the risk of disease among an exposed population with the
risk of disease among a non-exposed population. Mathematically, relative risk can be
defined as R1/R2 where R1 = the rate of disease among the exposed population and
R2 = the rate of disease in the non-exposed population. Boston, supra note 89, at 235;
see Green, supra note 55, at 647. "If the relative risk equals one (i.e., the numerator is
the same as the denominator), the risk in the exposed group is the same as the risk in
the nonexposed group, and there is no suggestion of any association between the exposure and the disease in question. If the relative risk is greater than one, the risk in the
exposed group is greater than in the non-exposed group, and there is a positive association between the exposure and the disease." Boston, supra note 89, at 235; Green,
supra note 55, at 647.
Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 717-18; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d
1311, 1320 (9th Cir. 1995); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958
(3rd Cir. 1990); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1403 (D.Or.
1996); Manko v. United States, 636 F. Supp. 1419, 1434 (W.D. Mo. 1986); Marder v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 630 F. Supp. 1087, 1092 (D. Md. 1986); Cook v. United States,
545 F. Supp. 306, 308 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
9 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
For example, one must ensure that the relative risk fits into an appropriate confidence interval before scientists will conclude that the statistical evidence is significant.
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especially so ar as it requires epidemiological proof.97 Professor
Michael D. Green, for example, has argued that courts should not
apply a burden of production that requires epidemiological evidence because, in many instances, such evidence simply does not
exist.98 Instead, Professor Green argues that "plaintiffs should be

See Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 723 (A confidence interval shows a 'range of values within
which the results of a study sample would be likely to fall if the study were repeated
numerous times.") (quoting Linda A. Bailey et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 169, 173 (1994));
Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 723 ("The generally accepted significance level or confidence
interval in epidemiological studies is 95%, meaning that if the study were repeated
numerous times, the confidence interval would indicate the range of relative risk values
would result 95% of the time.") (citations omitted). See also BOSTON & MADDEN, supra
note 86, at 379-81 (citing K.J. ROTHMAN, MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY 116 (1986)). In addition,
a careful fact-finder might reach a conclusion opposite from the inference raised by an
epidemiological study if strong particularized evidence exists. See Havner, 953 S.W.2d at
718 (We do not hold . . . that a relative risk of more than 2.0 is a litmus test or that
a single epidemiological test is legal sufficient evidence of causation. Other factors must
be considered."); Grassis v. Johns-Manville Corp., 591 A.2d 671, 675 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1991) ("Where, however, study after study has shown some positive correlation, although not to the factor of 2.0, it might be said that asbestos is at least a producing factor in some colon cancers, even if the precise biological process has not yet
been defined."); see also In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 964 F.2d 92, 97 (2d
Cir. 1992) (citing Grassis, 591 A.2d 671 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991)).
'" See Green, supra note 55; see also Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Toward a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV.,
2117 (1997); Wagner, supra note 55. Professor Wagner challenges the entire notion that
toxic tort plaintiffs ought to bear the burden of proof on the issue of causation. Professor Wagner argues that such a rule is premised on an incorrect perception "that scientific research on the long-term safety of products is produced spontaneously and in abundance, irrespective of the law." Wagner, supra note 55, at 774. Instead, Professoi" Wagner argues for a revised causation standard that places much of the burden of scientific
uncertainty on toxic tort defendants. Under Professor Wagner's proposal, if a "manufacturer is not able to publicize the 'minimal' safety research on its product where some
potential for exposure exists . . . , the plaintiff is entitled to a presumption that the
insufficiently tested product caused her harm. The plaintiff thus establishes a prima facie
case with proof of the following: (1) inadequate minimal testing on a product, (2) normal or foreseeable exposure to the product, and (3) serious harm that might be causally
linked to exposure to the product." Id. at 834-35.
Green, supra note 55, at 674-95. Professor Green explains:
For most potentially toxic substances, there will not be a solid body of epidemiologic evidence on which to rely. Epidemiology is expensive and time consuming, even ethically proscribed in certain contexts. There are thousands
upon thousands of synthetic agents being used in the United States that might
pose toxic risks, yet only a tiny fraction have been the subject of any epidemiologic inquiry. . . . Imposing a burden of production that includes an epidemiologic threshold will screen out all of these cases, but at a cost of precluding more refined attempts, based on animal studies, structure analysis, available
knowledge about biological mechanisms and related evidence, to make an assessment of whether there exists a causal relationship.
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required to prove causation by a preponderance of the available
evidence, not by some predetermined standard that may require
nonexistent studies."99
It is important to understand, however, that Professor Green
does not reject the doubling standard itself; rather, he objects that
courts have wrongly "created a veneer of infallibility and conclusiveness to epidemiology studies."" ° In addition, Professor
Green's argument is made in the context of cases where plaintiffs
are currently suffering from disease, not in the context of cases involving pre-symptom plaintiffs. In the latter type of case, the enhanced risk standard should be at least as strong as the standard
applied in the former type of case-if only because of the vastly
increased number of potential lawsuits. '
The primary hesitation about tort access in all cases involving
probabilistic evidence, of course, is the risk of being wrong about
02
the causal association and thereby deterring useful activity.1
These risks are exponentially larger, however, if the tort system
allows plaintiffs to obtain medical monitoring costs before they
Id. at 680 (footnotes omitted).
9 Green, supra note 55, at 674-95. Professor Green continues:
This means that in every case involving an alleged toxic agent for which a
mature epidemiologic record does not exist, analysis of the sufficiency of plaintiff's evidence would begin by considering the universe of available evidence
of toxicity. Theoretically, this could be limited to structure-activity analysis or a
series of adverse case reports. Evaluating the likelihood that the agent was
truly toxic (and ultimately whether, even if it was toxic, it caused plaintiff's
injury) would require the assessment of an expert schooled in that scientific
area. Even more difficult, where some evidence existed in two different areas-say in vitro and structure-activity-scientists who could span both fields
would be required to make a considered assessment of the weight of the
available evidence.
Id. at 681 (footnotes omitted).
'ooGreen, supra note 55, at 699.
' Even in the former type of case, Professor Green concedes that "opening the
courthouse doors to plaintiffs entering with such thin and attenuated evidence . . . is
discomfiting and unfortunate." Green, supra note 55, at 681.
Nonetheless, in such
cases, Professor Green thinks the balance of interests tilts toward tort access. Id. ('the
reality is that stronger and better evidence is unavailable through no fault of anyone and
a decision based on the preponderance of the available evidence . . . would seem in
keeping with the role of the civil justice system."). As discussed below, however, the
same is not necessarily true in cases where plaintiffs seek medical monitoring costs
before manifesting any symptoms of disease.
"02This has been one criticism of Bendectin and breast implant litigation. See, e.g.,
MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE
BREAST

IMPLANT CASE (1996); MICHAEL

D. GREEN,

BENDECTIN

CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCE LITIGATION (1996).
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manifest any symptoms of disease. 3 Where these individuals can
present strong evidence that would connect future disease to the
toxic exposure (i.e., if their chance of disease has doubled), the risks
are less troubling. Indeed, the threat of tort liability in such a case
might actually mitigate costs associated with future disease.' If
these individuals cannot present such evidence, however, tort access should be denied. In such cases, the link to causation is too
05
tenuous, and the threat of overdeterrence is simply too great.)
b. ProportionalLiability
A number of scholars, however, assert that traditional notions
of causation (even as extended by the use of statistical evidence)
0 6 Professor Glen
have little value in modern toxic tort litigation.
0. Robinson, for example, is among those who call for the application of "proportional liability" in cases where toxic exposure has increased a plaintiff's risk of disease. Professor Robinson explains:
Assuming that the risk is one that would give rise to liability when the
actual loss is suffered, why not adjudicate the entire case by awarding the
victim the present value of the risk at the point at which the risk can be
identified and given some measurable value? The value is equal to the
losses multiplied by the estimated probability
present value of the0 future
7
occurrence.1
their
of

While the proposal in this Article does not call for such a radical
change in the tort system, the proposal is not necessarily inconsis08
tent with the views of those who advocate proportional liability.
For example, think of the paradigm case set forth in the introduction to this Arti'o
cle. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. If our discussion focuses on post-manifestation plaintiffs, the tort system must address fifteen plaintiffs. If the tort system focuses on pre-manifestation plaintiffs, it might be forced to address 100,000 individuals who
were exposed to the toxin.
104 See infra notes 114-16, 143-46, 181 and accompanying text.

See supra note 78; infra notes 120-36 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 55; Rosenberg, supra note 3.
107 Robinson, supra note 55, at 786; see Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 881 ("From the
standpoint of corrective justice, the proportionality rule is unquestionably more effective
than the preponderance rule in achieving the tort system's goal of preserving the value
of entitlements.'); cf. Enterprise Responsibility Report, supra note 48, at 369-75 (advocating proportionate compensation if the attributable fraction of disease at a particular level
of exposure is between 20 and 80%).
"=Some scholars, however, suggest that the tort system's use of 'probabilistic causation" would require some limitations. For example, Professor Brennan argues:
[I]f carried to an extreme, use of probability of causation would challenge our
fundamental assumptions about evidence and tort causation. For example,
'o

'o'
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For example, Professor Robinson argues that one of the virtues of
proportional liability is that it would force the risk creator to bear
the burden of expected loss, while shifting responsibility to the risk
bearer to monitor that risk and take action to reduce its scope.109
The proposal in this Article serves the same goal, but focuses on
compensating victims with a high level of enhanced risk. In this
way, the proposal actually sharpens the efficiency of the tort system
by reducing the chance that tort law might pay individuals for
protections that they would not otherwise choose to purchase.
For example, few (if any) medical monitoring proponents suggest that courts award lump-sum damages to plaintiffs, ' presumably because they fear that plaintiffs will spend the money on goods
and services other than medical surveillance."' Logic dictates that

courts could consider every individual with lung cancer a member of a potential group of plaintiffs who could sue all the producers of particulate-matter air
pollution. A small attributable fraction of all lung cancers could be attributable
to this type of air pollution, perhaps less than one percent. If consolidation of
such a large class were possible, the case would be viable for plaintiffs and
their attomeys. Indeed, courts potentially could conceptualize many sorts of
injuries as such mass torts, undermining common-law doctrine in a worrisome
manner.
Brennan, supra note 64, at 63. In addition, those scholars who view "corrective justice'
as the ultimate goal of tort law would likely reject a system of proportional liability.
See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Tort Law, 2 J.L.
& PHIL. 37
(1982); infra note 119; cf. Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for
Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L.REv. 439 (1990) (arguing that proportional liability does
not necessarily violate corrective justice principles).
" The risk bearer, according to Professor Robinson, is in the best position to make
such decisions, for example, by purchasing insurance to protect against the harm. Robinson, supra note 55, at 787-88.
110 The Utah Supreme Court, for example, echoed the sentiments of the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Ayers when it stated that:
any award must provide for the defendant's payment of only the costs of the
medical monitoring services that will actually be provided to the plaintiff. The
trial court should not order payment to the plaintiff, in a lump sum or otherwise, of damages representing the costs of future monitoring.
Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 982 (Utah 1993); see also Bums
v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 34 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Potter v. Firestone
Rubber and Tire Co., 863 P.2d 795, 825 & n.28 (Cal. 1993); Brennan, supra note 64,
at 67-69; Enterprise Responsibility Report, supra note 48, at 379 ('We do not favor
awarding damages under the label of 'medical monitoring' and having the money paid
directly to plaintiffs to be spent on additional medical attention only if they are so inclined.").
.. Lee, supra note 57, at 268 & nn.113-14 (conceding that plaintiffs who receive
lump-sum payments for such costs 'show some propensity to spend the money on
things other than diagnostic tests."). The Reporters for the ALl project state that '[t]his
was reportedly the eventual outcome of the litigation in [Ayers]." Enterprise Responsibil-
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the lower the enhanced risk, the greater the odds that this would
occur. Creating a system that encourages payment for services that
individuals would not choose to purchase absent coercion makes
little sense. In fact, in discussing the similar topic of risk-based
claims for emotional distress in mass exposure cases, Professor David Rosenberg argues that the welfare of such plaintiffs may actually
be reduced under such conditions:
[S]uch damages decrease the welfare of potential plaintiffs by taking money from [the exposed individuals] in their healthy state - through, for
example, wage reductions and increased prices resulting from defendants
passing through the costs of higher liability insurance - and providing
them with damages that have lower marginal utility in their unhealthy
state.

..

. This cost pass-through is the pervasive fact underlying tort

liability dealing with business risks. That most consumers of insurance
would rationally reject coverage for mental distress is confirmed by the
fact that such coverage is virtually nowhere to be found on the private insurance market or in any state or federal program for workers' compensation or social insurance." 2

If it is true that medical monitoring plaintiffs who receive lumpsum "compensation' might spend their money on unrelated goods
and services, Professor Rosenberg's argument would apply in the
medical monitoring context: plaintiffs would be paying through
higher prices and reduced wages for insurance that they would not
choose to purchase on their own. As Professor Rosenberg points
out,'13 the threat of accrued liability for eventual harm should create proper incentives for defendants to make reasonable investments
in medical monitoring on their own."' If defendants have decided
not to do so with those who have a low or unquantified enhanced
risk of disease, this might signal that permitting tort law recovery
would lead to overdeterrence. To the extent that tort law should be
used to improve efficiency,"' however, the focus should be on
ity Report, supra note 48, at 379 n.59.
112David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in MassExposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 210, 226 (1996).
"I Id. at 234-35 (Professor Rosenberg makes this

point in the context of medical

monitoring claims, which he calls "mitigation' claims).

"1Id. at 234-35.
11 Professor Rosenberg explains that 'risk-based claims for mitigation" (such as actions

for medical monitoring costs) might still be useful where 'counterincentives" exist that
might discourage a defendant from taking mitigation actions. Id. at 235. For example,
Professor Rosenberg states that defendants might logically fear that members of the public will wrongly overestimate the risk of an activity, thereby subjecting the defendant to
.overbearing investigation and regulation, unjustified disparagement, and a flood of ha-
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plaintiffs with a higher enhanced risk of disease, as these individuals
are logically the ones who would more likely spend damage awards
on medical surveillance.
2.

Efficient Risk Allocation

The above argument raises another point in support of this
Article's proposed standard: the standard would improve the efficiency of risk allocation compared with the current muddle of
vague medical monitoring standards and proposals.
Numerous legal scholars identify deterrence as one of tort law's
primary goals." 6 Ideally, tort law should achieve this goal by encouraging actors to limit risk-taking actions to an economically efficient level." '7 Medical monitoring advocates routinely align their
advocacy with this purpose."'
If actors could confidently predict medical monitoring liabilities, this type of argument would be persuasive. Under current
standards that permit recovery regardless of the level of enhanced
risk," 9 however, efficient deterrence is unlikely. First, the lack of a
predictable standard undoubtedly increases transaction and litigarassing law suits." Id.
"I See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L.REv. 1801, 1801 (1997) (describing a "major camp' of tort
scholars who understand tort liability "as an instrument aimed largely at the goal of
deterrence, commonly explained within the framework of economics."). There are, however, other scholars who view corrective justice, rather than deterrence, as the fundamental goal of tort law. See Symposium, Corrective Justice and Formalism: The Care
One Owes One's Neighbors, 77 IOwA L.REv. (1992). A discussion of this sometimes
acrimonious debate is beyond the scope of this article. However, for a good account
of the parameters of the debate, see Schwartz, supra.
1,7See Rosenberg, supra note 112, at 234 ('[The deterrence aim of tort liability
seeks to induce potential business defendants to limit their risk taking to economically
efficient levels not only for purposes of maximizing the aggregate social welfare, but
also for purposes of avoiding distributionally regressive effects on the less well off in
society.").
11' See supra note 49. As one commentator has written:
Requiring the tortious actor to intemalize the costs of medical surveillance
necessitated by his activity may result in an efficient allocation of resources.
Thus, societal resources will be spent only on those products and services
possessing worth greater than their 'aggregate' (business and social) costs...
Societal production will consequently be altered to reflect consumer choice.
Gara, supra note 20, at 279.
"' See Potter v. Firestone Rubber & Tire Co., 863 P.2d 795, 817 (Cal. 1993); Ayers
v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 304 (N.J. 1987); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 979 (Utah 1993).
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tion costs.120 Second, the typical deterrence argument fails to adequately consider whether a defendant's activity might be replacing
more dangerous risks than it has created.
The latter concern is the more fundamental of the two. Forcing
defendants to internalize unmatured risk in the nature of medical
monitoring expenses-without a defined and significant enhanced
risk hurdle-raises serious concerns of overdeterrence. Initially, it
places in the hands of the legal community extremely wide latitude
in deciding which public risks should be addressed. In broader
contexts, commentators such as Peter Huber have argued that tort
law is a poor place to make such decisions.'
Huber's views regarding risk allocation certainly have not escaped criticism.'22 However, even Huber's most severe critics appear to disagree only on a "macro" scale. Professors Clayton P.
Gillette and James E. Krier, for example, have criticized Huber's
general conclusions as overly-ambitious and "remarkably prema-

,20 Plaintiffs in such an environment are likely motivated by factors unrelated to deterring the maximum amount of risk. See infra notes 122, 147-52 and accompanying text.
Defendants, meanwhile, are encouraged to litigate where they might otherwise settle
disputes if the standards were more clear. It is worth noting that litigation costs in this
context are no small matter. Professor Gary T. Schwartz, for example, estimates that for
every dollar that comes into the tort system, only forty or fifty cents ends up compensating injured victims. Gary T. Schwartz, The A.LI. Reporters' Study, 15 U. HAW. L. REV.
529, 537 (1993). He argues that "when tort law is considered from the perspective of
efficiently compensating accident victims, its very high overhead becomes quite hard to
justify.' Id.; see also Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior
of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1183-89, 128183 (1992) (stating that transaction costs are the most expensive part of litigation and
reporting that in the middle 1980s "it cost society $1.92 to deliver $1 of compensation
to a victim of negligent injury." Id. at 1282.); Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with
Tort Law, 73 CAL L. REV. 555, 598-603 (1985) (discussing high transaction costs involved in Agent Orange, Bendectin, asbestos, and IUD litigation).
12, See Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277 (1985). Huber wrote:
For the plaintiff's bar, the most attractive risks are those for which the evidence is the most unusual and lurid, the class to be represented the largest,
and the problems of proof the lowest. According to these criteria, the risks
that happen to land at the top of the list are not likely to be those that
would be selected by risk experts engaged in a sober examination of the
competing sources of risk in a market filled with a rich variety of hazardous
substitutes.
Id. at 318; see also E. Donald Elliot, Why Courts? Comment on Robinson, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 799, 803 (1985) ('there is . . . reason to believe that other institutions are better
equipped than lay courts and juries to assess risks.").
,22 See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U.
PA. L. REv. 1027 (1990).
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ture."' 23 Gillette and Krier, however, "stop short of saying that the
present institutional arrangements are,

. .

the best we can hope for

given current understanding." '2 4 Therefore, it is worth exploring
whether public risk assessment through the tort system makes sense
in the specific context of this Article. That is, who should assess risk
when potential medical monitoring claimants have been exposed to
toxic substances but have not yet manifested any symptoms of
disease?
In this context, a tort regime that fails to apply a defined enhanced risk standard will provide little check on litigation that is
driven by factors unrelated to the actual risks of a defendant's activity.12 In fact, "erratic risk internalization" ultimately might impose
more costs on safer activities in some markets, thereby encouraging
consumption of more dangerous goods and services.2 6 This is exactly the opposite of what medical monitoring advocates envision
when they support using courts to address public risk.'27
In a 1985 article, Huber used the example of childhood vaccinations to support his argument that agencies deter public risk more
efficiently than courts. Clearly, the development of mandatory public programs to vaccinate children reduced an enormous amount of
public risk-i.e., the harm caused by childhood diseases. Yet, vaccinations do have dangerous side effects that harm a small number
of users.'28 For example, while the whooping cough vaccination
saves more than 400 lives each year, it also causes serious brain
damage in a very small number of people.'29
123 Id. at 1031.
124

Id.

125 This,

once again, might help explain why proponents fear that medical monitoring
plaintiffs might not actually spend "compensation" on medical monitoring costs. See
supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
16 Huber, supra note 121, at 292.
127 See Gara, supra note 20, at 279.
128

Huber, supra note 121, at 285 ('vaccination, like everything else, is not perfectly

safe").
'm

Huber described the situation as follows:
[U]se of the vaccine prevents an estimated 322,000 cases of whooping cough
per year. An estimated 457 persons per year would die of the disease without
the vaccination program; use of the vaccine reduces annual mortality to 44,
for a net annual savings of 413 lives. Tragically, however, about 1 in every
310,000 recipients experiences serious, long-term brain damage. Without the
vaccine there would be 29 such cases per year, vaccination raises that figure
to 54 cases, an increase of 25 cases per year. The aggregate figures could
scarcely be less ambiguous: receiving the vaccine increases the risk of one
particular form of injury a little, but drastically reduces the risk of another.
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The brain damage cases, despite the obvious overall benefit of
the vaccination program, constitute a "public risk."13 It should be
obvious, however, that a rational tort system would not want to
deter this public risk so as to revert to the disease's original (and
much greater) risk. Yet, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the
tort system was used as the primary vehicle for addressing the risk,
this is exactly what happened as increasing numbers of lawsuits
3
threatened to drive vaccine manufacturers out of the market.1 '
Fortunately, in 1986, Congress placed restrictions on litigation
against vaccine manufacturers when it enacted the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act ("NCVIA") to compensate children who
suffer from the side effects of childhood vaccinations.1 32 Commentators generally have praised the NCVIA for stabilizing vaccine
prices and alleviating fears of vaccine shortages. 33
The success of the NCVIA provides at least one contextual
argument that administrative agencies have regulated public risk
better than the tort system. As Huber's critics might point out, however, it would be premature to conclude from one such anecdote
that the tort system should play no role in the regulation of public
risk. Indeed, even the NCVIA envisions the tort system as supplemental in regulating risks associated with childhood vaccines. 34
The ultimate goal should be to ensure that the tort system is re-

Huber, supra note 121, at 288 (citing A.R. Hinmon & J.P. Koplan, Pertussis and Pertussis Vaccine; Reanalysis of Benefits, Risks, and Costs, 251 JAMA 3104 (1984)).
M3Huber, supra note 121, at 285 (A mandatory immunization program certainly
represents a 'public' hazard: it is universally shared, individually inescapable, and, at
least for some, entirely involuntary.'). This is similar to a situation where a large number
of people are exposed to a toxic substance due to the output of a manufacturing facility.
'31 Huber, supra note 121, at 287-89.
132 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300aa-1 to -34
(West 1988).
133 See Kellen F. Cloney, Note, Aids Vaccine Manufacturers v. Tort Regime: The
Need for Alternatives, 49 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 559, 596 (1992); H. William Smith III,
Note, Vaccinating AIDS Vaccine Manufacturers Against Product Liability, 42 CASE W.
Some commentators, however, have questioned the
RES. L. REM. 207, 228 (1992).
NCVIA's effectiveness. See Laura Mazzuca, Shot Through with Problems: A Partial Success, Vaccine Injury Fund Faces Case Logjam, Funding Shortfalls, Bus. INS., Aug. 24,
1992, at 1, available in 1992 WL 9479842.
'1 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-11(a)(4)-(8). For a proposal of how the tort system should
co-exist with a legislative compensation scheme in a different factual context, see
Andrew R. Klein, A Legislative Alternative to 'No Cause' Liability in Blood Products
Litigation, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 107, 128-134 (1995).
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tained where it works best-this ordinarily being where the tortious
conduct35 of an identifiable defendant has caused a defined
injury.
To place this discussion squarely in the context of medical
monitoring, imagine two situations. In Situation A, BigCo has negligently exposed 5000 citizens of Niceville to "toxzene," a chemical
that is designated as one of the most toxic substances by the
ATSDR. 136 Epidemiological studies indicate that the level of exposure experienced by Niceville's citizens has increased the risk of
liver cancer from 10 in 100,000 to 25 in 100,000.13' Experts are

willing to testify that medical procedures exist that would make the
early detection and treatment of disease possible and beneficial.138
In this situation, tort law should be the preferred institution to
regulate risk, and tort law should impose liability on BigCo for the
costs of medical surveillance of the 5000 exposed citizens. 139 We
have a defined group of plaintiffs. We can assign the case to an
established "allocation model" (the example posits negligence). 4 °
Moreover, by viewing each individual's "injury" as the enhanced
risk of disease (rather than the exposure itself or the need for surveillance), we have a link to the tradition of individualized causation.'41 In fact, a logical entity in BigCo's position might well offer
medical surveillance to the community before citizens institute
litigation. By doing so, BigCo would be mitigating damages that it
almost certainly would incur in the future'42 and reduce its litiga131

See, e.g., Klein, supra note 134, at 112-15 (arguing for a "narrowly-focused'

legis-

lative compensation scheme in conjunction with a residual tort system in the context of
injuries caused by contaminated blood products).
13 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
137 See supra note 89 for a brief description of epidemiology.
138 See Paoli II, 35 F.3d
717, 787 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Paoli 1, 916 F.2d 829,
852 (3d Cir. 1990)).
1"9 This assumes, however, that the individuals have no risk factors that would alter
the increased risk in a manner significant to the "more likely than not" causation standard. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. For example, suppose a citizen of
Niceville had smoked two packs of cigarettes for twenty years and that the background
rate of liver cancer for smokers at this level is 35 in 100,000. If the exposure to toxzene increased this individual's risk to 45 in 100,000, the individual should not be permitted to recover the costs of medical surveillance in tort since, in a subsequent action for
the actual onset of disease, she would not be able to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the exposure caused her cancer.
140 See supra note 47; see also supra text accompanying note 80.
141 Specifically, any member of the community that ends up developing liver cancer
would later be able to prove that it is more likely than not that he did so as a result
of BigCo's activities.
142 See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 112, at 234-35 (arguing that risk-based claims for
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tion costs in the process.'43 In addition, use of the tort system in
this situation would minimize the concerns of those who argue
against the use of courts to regulate public risk. Under this Article's
proposed standard, a lawyer's choice to file suit in unmatured risk
cases would be limited by a relatively clear enhanced risk standard
(i.e., the plaintiff will have to prove that if she ultimately contracts
the disease, the exposure was more likely than not the cause).
Moreover, the choice of which public risks to attack through litigation would be governed partially by expert regulators, since the
toxin involved would be on the ATSDR list.' Finally, the very
fact that the proposal restricts damages to medical surveillance costs
means that such expenditures should mitigate future damages. In
fact, the use of tort law for this purpose may well be more efficient
than funding surveillance through an administrative compensation
scheme, which inevitably would involve transaction costs associated
4
with raising funds for its operation. '
Now, imagine Situation B. In this case, LargeCo exposes
20,000 citizens in Well City to "chemilite," a toxic substance which
is not on the ATSDR list. Here, assume that no epidemiological
studies are available to prove enhanced risk, although an expert is
4
willing to testify, based on toxicology studies, ' that the exposure

mitigation are normally unnecessary for deterrence purposes because the 'threat of liability for accrued ultimate harm generally creates optimal incentives for defendants to make
reasonable investments in medical monitoring, . . . and other actions designed to reduce'
exposure to liability for accrued ultimate harm.').
"I This presumes, of course, that statutes of limitation do not preclude such plaintiffs
from later bringing suit. Although this article does not address this topic, courts and
commentators are nearly unanimous in asserting that limitation periods should be tolled
in mass exposure/latent disease cases. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 8, at 326-27; Melissa
Moore Thompson, Comment, Enhanced Risk of Disease Claims: Limiting Recovery to
Compensation for Loss, Not Chance, 72 N.C. L. REv. 453, 468-69 (1994); cf. Enterprise
Responsibility Report, supra note 48, at 376 ("Simply tolling the statute of limitations either explicitly or through a 'time of discovery' doctrine - would, however, be inefficient in a mass toxic tort case' because of individual variances in latency periods).
141 See supra notes 78-79, 137 and accompanying text.
14' Most likely, such funding would come through taxation raised from risk creators,
like BigCo. See Klein, supra note 134, at 115-16. See infra notes 174-81 and accompanying text.
" Toxicology is the scientific discipline "concerned with the capacity of chemicals or
environmental agents to produce harmful effects in living organisms." Boston, supra note
89, at 213. Professor Boston explains that '[tloxicologists study the interactions between
chemicals and biological systems, attempt to identify the mechanism of action and attempt to assess quantitatively the relationship between doses of chemicals and responses
in living systems." Id. Because toxicology studies are not done on humans, however,
they are generally considered less reliable than epidemiological studies in proving actual
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will lead to some (undefined) level of increased risk of disease. 147
We will further assume an expert is willing to testify that medical
procedures exist that would make the early detection and treatment
of the disease possible and beneficial.
In Situation B, use of the tort system is much less logical than
in Situation A. First, it is unclear to LargeCo whether it will ultimately be responsible for any resulting disease. Because of this uncertainty, LargeCo's incentive to mitigate possible future damages is
less than BigCo's incentive in Situation A.' 48 Second, without
quantified evidence of enhanced risk, it is less clear to plaintiffs that
money received in compensation should be used on medical surveillance costs. At a minimum, plaintiffs on the margin would use
the money for other goods and services.149 Finally, even though
the ATSDR implicitly recognizes that chemilite is "less" harmful
than toxzene, and even though it is possible that less harm will
result from LargeCo's conduct than from BigCo's conduct, the larger
pool of potential plaintiffs means that plaintiffs' lawyers will more
likely be drawn to Situation B than to Situation A.'
Does this mean that society should not manage the risk in
Situation B at all? Not at all. It just means that we should not use
the tort system to do so. Rather, in cases where the tort system is
unlikely to operate efficiently, legislative and administrative bodies
should make risk management judgments.'
causation in a toxic exposure case.
147 Courts are divided on whether such testimony would be sufficient to support a

finding of actual causation. Compare Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Co., 788 F.2d 741 (11th
Cir. 1986) and Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Corp., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984) with
Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989) and Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (rex. 1997), cert. denied 118 S. Ct. 1799
(1998).
148 This, of course, will lead to a situation where it is more likely that litigation over
the medical monitoring costs will ensue. Therefore, transaction costs will rise, and time
will pass with no one receiving compensation for medical costs.
149 See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text. Proponents of a liberal medical
monitoring rule argue that the solution to this problem is to not award lump-sum damages to plaintiffs. Instead, proponents argue, the courts should behave like an agency
and supervise each of the claimant's expenditures. See, e.g., Blumenberg, supra note 49,
at 683-95. However, if the only proper way to allocate damages in this situation is
through an agency-like process, one should consider whether it might not be more
sensible to use an agency in the first place.
1 0 This, of course, is at the heart of Huber's criticism of the judicial system. See
supra note 121, 173 and accompanying text. Huber also might point out that this decision would likely occur without regard to the relative productive value of the
companies' activities. Id.
151 This statement neither intends to idealize administrative risk regulation nor ignore
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Ill. MEDICAL MONITORING OUTSIDE THE TORT SYSTEM

Proposals for administrative alternatives to tort law are not
novel."5 2 Many proposals, however, exist only in the context of an
all-or-nothing debate-i.e., either tort law should be completely
3
eliminated in favor of administrative compensation systems,'1 or
tort law should be broadened to encompass nearly all public
risks. ' 4 As this author has argued, however, there is room for
middle ground.' 5 The following section asserts that this middle
ground can encompass administrative funding of medical surveillance costs for individuals exposed to toxic substances who cannot
avail themselves of the tort law standard proposed in this Article.
Consideration of administrative compensation for accident
victims requires an evaluation of at least four factors: (1) the
program's jurisdiction; (2) the program's financing; (3) claimants'
56
compensation; and (4) claimants' access to the tort system. With
respect to medical monitoring, this Article has already addressed the
fourth factor.5 7 The third factor does not require significant discussion in this context-approved claimants should receive compensation based on expert testimony regarding the level of surveillance that would make early detection of disease possible and beneficial.5' The remainder of this section deals with the more funda59
mental factors of jurisdiction and financing."
capture theory, which argues that motivations in political markets are similar to those in
other markets. See, e.g., Gillette & Krier, supra note 122, at 1064-70. Instead, the statement merely intends to precede this Article's argument that there is room for a middle
ground in the public risk debate which would delineate circumstances under which both
courts and agencies might operate to deter a proper amount of risk.
,s2 See Oscar S. Gray, Symposium: Future Prospects for Compensation Systems, 52
MD. L. REv. 893 (1993); Enterprise Responsibility Report, supra note 48, at 441-83 (Chapter on Administrative Compensation Schemes); Abraham, supra note 86, at 885-98;
Sugarman, supra note 120.
153 See, e.g., Sugarman, supra note 120; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Encouraging Safety:
The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REv. 1281 (1980).
s See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 55; Rosenberg, supra note 3.
155 See Klein, supra note 134, at 111-15.
' Klein, supra note 134, at 112-34 (citing throughout to Robert L. Rabin, Some
Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation Scheme, 52
MD. L. REv. 951 (1993) and Abraham, supra note 86).
"s That is, in the view of this author, tort law should compensate individual plaintiffs
for the cost of medical monitoring in many cases where the plaintiff is able to prove
that exposure to a toxic substance has more than doubled her risk of contracting a disease. See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
:58 See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig. (Paoli II), 35 F.3d 717 (3rd Cir. 1994).
159 This Article does not, however, purport to propose the particular mechanics of an
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A. Jurisdiction
An administrative compensation program should have narrowly-defined boundaries.16 Some commentators disagree and argue
that administrative programs must broadly replace tort law. 6
Such broad-based proposals, however, rarely offer realistic relief for
accident victims who find tort law inadequate. By comparison,
narrowly-focused proposals can serve as models of how to help
individuals who face obstacles to tort law compensation. 62
While a medical monitoring program could not predict the
exact individuals who might become claimants, 163 the program
would be narrowly focused in restricting its scope to certain types
of fact settings (pre-injury toxic exposure cases) and damages (medical surveillance costs). This focus makes sense both prospectively
and retrospectively. Looking backwards, the program would replace
the tort system's inefficiencies where a defendant's liabilities are
least clear to the parties involved.1'6 Looking forward, the program
would serve the interests of current claimants (who might learn of
the onset of disease at an earlier date) and future claimants, by
developing epidemiological evidence that might encourage private
settlements. 65

administrative compensation scheme. For an example of this author's views on the mechanics of such a scheme for the victims of a contaminated pharmaceutical product, see
Klein, supra note 134, at 118-20, 123-24, 127-28; see also Paul A. LeBel, Beginning the
Endgame: The Search for an Injury Compensation System Alternative to Tort Liability for
Tobacco-Related Harms, 24 N. Ky. L. Rev. 457 (1997).
"0 See Klein, supra note 134, at 112-15; see also Rabin, supra note 156, at 964
("The starting point in any discussion of the components of an administrative compensation scheme is the boundaries question - the determination of which claims fall within
the system and which remain under the domain of tort.").
161 See Pierce, supra note 153, at 12&2-83 ('incremental changes . . . are often inconsistent conceptually and functionally, and most are too limited in scope to offer any
real promise for improving the allocation of safety-related resources.'); Sugarman, supra
note 120, at 626 (referring to small-scale proposals as a "crazy quilt' of special interest
concessions).
162 See Klein, supra note 134, at 112-14.
'C Of. Klein, supra note 134 (proposing an administrative compensation scheme to
compensate the easily identified group of hemophiliacs who have been exposed to HlVcontaminated blood products).
164 See supra notes 45, 117-53 and accompanying text.
,65In this regard, the proposal is nearly consistent with the view of the Reporters for
the ALI's Enterprise Liability Report:
The kind of medical monitoring that we envision . . . is some form of scientific epidemiological investigation of where and when the disease actually
manifests itself among the exposed group. This work would serve both to
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Returning to Situation A and Situation B for an illustration: As
discussed above, the exposed individuals in Situation A should use
166 Because
the tort system to recover medical monitoring costs.
defendant BigCo can foresee future liability for the costs of disease
that might become manifest within the population, the hope is67that
BigCo would fund medical surveillance without litigation.' In
Situation B, however, the tort system would not encourage such
6 8 Nonetheless, under today's
efficient resolution of a dispute.
murky standards, plaintiffs often are encouraged to go forward with
litigation anyway. With a clear enhanced risk standard in place,
however, this temptation would be greatly reduced, as the plaintiffs'
likelihood of success in tort would be diminished.
Situation B likely would arise in one of two contexts-first,
where there is a dearth of scientific evidence connecting exposure
to any particular level of enhanced risk (we will call this Situation
B-1); or, second, where such evidence exists, but the level of enhanced risk is low (i.e., less than double the background rate; we
will call this Situation B-2). In Situation B-1, government agencies
should have the responsibility of deciding whether to coordinate
studies concerning the risks of exposure. As noted above, this
would alleviate the fears of exposed individuals; it would mitigate
future disease-related costs; and it would help both the tort system
and the nation's regulators more effectively govern future instances
69
of exposure to the toxin at issue."
Situation B-2 is more difficult. Obviously, the government
cannot (and should not) fund studies pertaining to every individual
who is exposed to any level of toxic substance. Someone must

inform the medical profession about which people are in real need of early
treatment and to provide reassurance to people who turn out not to be at
risk.
Enterprise Responsibility Report, supra note 48, at 378-79 (footnote omitted).
166 See supra notes 137-46 and accompanying text.
settlement
167 Several commentators, for example, have favorably pointed to a 1986
consuthe
contaminated
which
companies
between Hawaiian consumers and local dairy
mers' milk supply with heptachlor, a possibly carcinogenic pesticide. See Gara, supra
note 20, at 299 ("the $4,000,000 settlement fund will be used primarily to monitor
infants whose mothers consumed the contaminated milk"); Enterprise Responsibility Report, supra note 48, at 378-79 & n.58 ("A number of studies have been commissioned
to document the effect of such exposures, for example through . . . comparisons beelsewhere.").
tween lactating mothers in Oahu and lactating mothers
16 See supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
181 and accom169 See supra notes 105, 114-16, 143-46, 166-67; see also infra note
panying text.
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engage in line-drawing to make reasoned judgments about which
activities create more public risks than they replace. 7 ' In this narrow context, the appropriate decision maker almost certainly should
be regulators with scientific expertise, not tort lawyers. 7 '
B. Funding
Of course, government-sponsored studies would be expensive
and, under current political circumstances, any new government
program would need a sound source of funding. Such funding
logically should come from the risk-creating entities themselves.'72
Professor Kenneth Abraham has described two ways in which government can charge risk-creating entities to fund administrative
compensation systems: (1) quantity-based charges against the manufacturers of toxins based on the volume and toxicity of each
item' 73 or (2) quality-based charges against the handlers of toxins
that would vary "inaccordance with the number of injuries clearly
caused by an enterprise's activities."' 74 Because the program envisioned here would deal with pre-injury claimants-and not on
"clearly caused" injuries-it seems logical to focus a funding methodology on quantity-based charges.
Some scholars, however, criticize quantity-based charges for
providing inadequate deterrence against risk-producing activities.
Professor Jennifer Arlen, for example, argues in favor of "experience
rating" through quality-based assessments to ensure that each injurer
more directly bears the costs of the risks that it created.' 5 This
See Huber, supra note 121, at 320; supra notes 120-36 and accompanying text.
As Huber stated (albeit in the context of a broader argument):
Who then should decide how much public risk we will accept and in what
areas? The answer is painfully obvious to almost everyone outside the legal
community: expert administrative agencies, not lawyers. To make life safer,
faster, we need not more scientists in the legal process, but fewer lawyers in
the scientific one.
Huber, supra note 121, at 329.
70

171

172

See Rabin, supra note 156, at 976 ("Typically, a . . . scheme is financed through

charges imposed on those parties engaged in the injury-producing activity.').
"7 Abraham, supra note 86, at 890.
174 Abraham, supra note 86, at 890. See also Bradford C. Mank, Preventing Bhopal:
"Dead Zones' and Toxic Death Risk Index Taxes, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 761, 800 (1992)
(proposing a "toxic death risk index tax' to be based on the "risks of potential environmental harm rather than actual pollution amounts').
...
Jennifer H. Arlen, Compensation Systems and Efficient Deterrence, 52 MD.L.REV.
1093, 1099 (1993); see Abraham, supra note 86, at 890 (quantity-based charges might
have "no effect on the level of safety at which the activities using these substances
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criticism, however, becomes diminished if a compensation scheme
is narrowly focused.176 Under such circumstances, high-level risk
creators already would be forced to internalize medical monitoring
costs through the tort system (or through settlements coerced by the
threat of liability). We only reach the issue of administrative compensation where the risk level is low or, more likely, less than
clear.177 Experience rating in such cases would be-almost by definition-imprecise. Therefore, it is more sensible to take advantage
of the easier-to-administer quantity-based charge system, essentially
spreading the cost of learning about the substance's potential harm78
ful effects to all users of a particular substance.
In sum, government agencies should decide when (or whether)
medical surveillance for populations exposed to toxins
fund
to
where members of the population cannot maintain a tort action and
where private settlements have not done so. Funding for such programs should come from the risk-creating entities in the form of
taxes on the production or manufacture of harmful toxins. Such
programs would place the decision-making process in the proper
hands. It would mitigate future disease-related costs, and it would
more effectively deter future harm than would an expanded tort
system.' 79

were conducted, because the charges levied would not vary with these levels of safety').
76 See Klein, supra note 134, at 121-22 (arguing for quantity-based charges to fund a
compensation scheme for victims of contaminated blood products).
See supra notes 165-73 and accompanying text.
'
378 Some commentators question the validity of the argument that quantity-based charges would deter less risk than quality-based charges. See Rabin, supra note 156, at 977
('From a deterrence perspective, it is far from clear that the choice between a flat-tax
and a risk-sensitive schedule of charges makes any substantial difference.'); Abraham,
supra note 86, at 891 ('[he shift to funds financed by these enterprises would neither
sacrifice the incentive-creating capacity of the mass tort system nor increase it substantially."). Even these scholars, however, admit that '[Qaimess considerations serve as an
alternative rationale for creating as close a linkage as possible between risk-producing
activities and financial responsibility for consequences." Rabin, supra note 156, at 977.
'" For anecdotal support of this point, one can again consider the childhood vaccine
experience. See supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text. After passage of the NCVlA,
which was financed primarily through taxes on the vaccine manufacturers, vaccine prices
fell and shortage problems were alleviated. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying
text. Therefore, it at least appears that there was no problem with having the manufacturers internalize the costs associated with the vaccine's side-effects; rather, the problem
in the late 1970s and early 1980s was forcing manufacturers to absorb the cost of litigation designed to compensate for the same harm.
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CONCLUSION

In rejecting the plaintiff's medical monitoring claim in MetroNorth, the Supreme Court stated:
We do not deny important competing considerations - of a kind that
may have led some courts to provide a form of liability. We do not deny
that... [the plaintiff] is sympathetic and he has suffered wrong at the
hands of a negligent employer. But we are more troubled ...

by the

potential systemic effects of creating a new, full-blown, tort law cause of
action ....

The reality is that competing interests are at stake -

and

those interests sometimes can be reconciled in ways other than simply
through the creation of a full-blown, traditional, tort law cause of action.
We have not tried to balance these, or other competing considerations
18

here.

0

This Article has attempted to balance the "competing considerations" to which the Supreme Court refers. In so doing, this Article
has argued that medical monitoring is not, itself, a unique cause of
action but simply a description of damages that courts may award
under appropriate circumstances where a plaintiff has been exposed
to a toxic substance but has not yet manifested any symptoms of
disease. In particular, this Article has asserted that a plaintiff ordinarily should recover medical monitoring damages only when she
proves that the exposure more than doubled her enhanced risk of
disease.'"' This standard maintains tort law's connection to traditional notions of causation. It also provides tort law with a more
precise ability to promote efficiency than the vague standards set
forth in current case law. In other situations, this Article has argued
that tort law is not the appropriate place for medical monitoring
recovery.
More broadly, this Article has attempted to contribute to the
continuing debate over the interplay between the tort system and
agency action in assisting those who are (or may be) harmed by the
ever-increasing presence of toxins in our society. Hopefully, such
coexistence is not only possible but can be beneficial to society's
effort to sensibly regulate environmental risks.

18

Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, .,

2123-24 (1997).
,8, See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.

117 S. Ct. 2113,

